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Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational
Society
Gidon Gottliebt
Any theory of law that by virtue of its emphasis on law courts
and on enforceable remedies focuses mainly on the individual, the
State, regulation, and the discrete transactions of the marketplace,
is woefully incomplete. It fails to address the broad realm of inter-
action between the colossal institutions and organizations that
dominate advanced societies, and it neglects the way in which law
functions as law among them. One common theme underlies the
intense dissatisfaction with the formal legal ordering of industrial
relations, ongoing contracts, and international law: on account of
the character of relations between the parties, their conduct is far
removed from the demands of the formal legal order. This dissatis-
faction can be found, for example, in the work of an English royal
commission on industrial relations.1 It was also reflected in the
work of the Uniform Commercial Code Commission that adapted
the law of contracts to the practices and needs of commerce,2 and
it is expressed today in the perceived inadequacy of legal remedies
for breaches of sovereign loan agreements. Scholars have voiced
their dissatisfaction. Clyde Summers, for example, observed that
the law of contracts so far as it consists of specific legal rules, has
little relevance for collective agreements 4 and Ian Macneil has
criticized the transactional bias of classical contract law.5 This cri-
tique is so persistent and uniform that I have been led to question
some familiar and powerful views about legal ordering. It is my
position that the much lamented "inadequacies" in the law of in-
dustrial relations, in the law of contracts, and in international law
t Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, University of Chicago Law
School.
I See generally ROYAL COaMMSSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYER'S ASSOCIATIONS
1965-1968, REPORT, CMD. 3623 (1968) (Lord Donovan, chairman) [hereinafter cited as DONO-
VAN REPORT].
' See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
4 See Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law on Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525
(1969).
5 See generally I. MAcNrm, THE NEw SocIAL CoNTRAcT passim (1980).
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are not so much the result of deficiencies specific to those fields as
of a more fundamental and systematic misperception about the na-
ture of legal ordering itself.
In this article I shall advance a number of propositions that
are meant to form a related and coherent whole with regard to how
law functions as law in important areas of human concern. I shall
refer to this perspective as "Relationism."
(1) The idea that a single all encompassing concept of law ac-
counts for all juridical phenomena in modern societies in a wide
range of complex settings cannot be sustained. Different kinds of
social contexts generate different forms of legal order.
(2) The identification of what is a relevant "social context" is
by no means self-evident. This article focuses on "effectiveness" in
juridical arrangements between institutions, groups, and other in-
strumentalities bound together in ongoing long-term relationships.
I shall refer to a society under the sway of institutions as a rela-
tional society.
(3) In a relational society the "relational aspect" of rules
(which refers to how rules function as such in a relational society)
must be distinguished from their "external aspect" (which refers to
social pressure from strangers to a relationship) and from their
"internal aspect" (which refers to how members of a group who
accept rules view their own behavior).
(4) The idea that law is necessarily derived from the State
through its legislative and judicial organs and that it depends upon
the State for its efficacy is warranted neither by a historical per-
spective nor by the experience of relational societies. The separa-
tion between law and State is a feature of relational societies.
(5) The source of juridical norms in a relational order is to be
found in agreements, arrangements, and other patterns of interac-
tion between the parties. The pronouncements of the courts of the
State and the laws of the other branches of government may pur-
port to govern a relational order formally subject to the State, but
they are not sources of law in such relationships; they are external
to them.
(6) The dominant aspect of juridical activities in relational so-
cieties is not of a litigious character. It centers instead on the prac-
tices of actors and on their usages, customs, and interpretations
that mediate between actors' actual patterns of conduct and the
formal juridical instruments that are deemed to govern them. It
focuses also on the negotiation and renegotiation of juridical in-
struments accepted as binding. The question of jurisprudence is
how law functions as law in different societies.
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(7) Court-centered legal analysis reflects an ideology that iden-
tifies law with the law of the State. Legal analysis that focuses pri-
marily on legal decisions distorts the character of juridical rela-
tions in relational societies in which the submission of disputes to
courts of law is an infrequent and incidental aspect of ongoing pat-
terns of interaction.
(8) Juridical arrangements developed in relational societies are
often analogous to classical contracts, but should not be confused
with them. The juridical acts and agreements of institutions and
groups engaged in durable relations constitute distinct juridical
phenomena.
(9) Relationism views international law as a paradigm for the
juridical order of relational societies. Far from constituting a
"problem" for legal theory, international law has a profound ex-
planatory power.
(10) A relational approach focuses on time-on the temporal
dimension of relationships. Emphasis on discrete transactions ab-
stracted from the ongoing relationships in which they occur dis-
torts the character of the transactions and of the relationships
themselves.
(11) The concept of a legal system centered on the State and
its officials cannot account for the juridical system of relational so-
cieties. The circumstances under which a juridical system can be
said to arise in a relational society must be identified in terms
other than those of the legal system of the State.
These propositions rest on juridical practices common to a
number of fields, for example, on practices of labor and manage-
ment. These are practices that can be documented and that have
already been the object of careful studies. These propositions are
designed to offer a better account of the operation of law in a rela-
tional society than that provided by State-centered theories about
the nature of law.
I. RELATIONAL PRACTICES
A. Effectiveness
You will search the cases in vain for many suits involving
institutionalized relationships; when you do find them, they
are apt to have arisen in bankruptcy. The cases that are to be
found generally involve "one shot" deals-situations where
the breaching party did not fear loss of good will and, in addi-
tion, the settlement offer was too small to be tolerated or feel-
ings were too aroused to permit settlement on any basis.
1983]
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But if businessmen buyers do not rely very much on con-
tract law, what is the purpose of the involved structure of
buyer's remedies that we study and teach? Would nonlegal
sanctions be enough to police most important performances
without contract remedies to back them up? We do not
know.'
In sustained relationships the effectiveness of agreements rests
primarily upon factors other than the intervention of the State.
The courts, which are there "to put muscle into agreements," are
often precluded from having any role at all. Reliance on the rela-
tional aspect as the true basis for the effectiveness of international
loan agreements is widespread. This reliance has been character-
ized by Dr. Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board:
[I]t is sometimes thought that the usual rules of lending risk
do not apply to sovereign borrowers. It has been said that
lending to countries is less risky than lending to businesses or
individuals because a country, unlike a business or individual,
will always be around. Country lending, it is sometimes said,
is free of final bankruptcy and definitive loss. All that is
needed is occasional rescheduling that gives the lender a
breathing space ....
Consider the uses of loan agreements with large sovereign bor-
rowers when enforcement is simply out of the question for the
banks. The degree of mutual dependence between lenders and bor-
rowers is such that neither side can escape unhurt if the other fails.
The relationship between American commercial banks and the
Mexican government is of this character. The mutual dependence
of the banks and the big borrowers is highlighted by talk of the
formation of a coalition of big borrowers (a borrowers' OPEC) that
would parallel the coalition of lenders reflected in the cross-default
provisions of most loan agreements. A clash between big lenders
and big borrowers, if it were to take place, would threaten the
banks and the borrowing countries alike. Yet at some time in the
future the borrowing countries will need to return to the capital
markets and the banks will want to resume business with them. A
6 Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
832, 836 (footnote omitted).
7H. Wallich, International Lending and the Role of Bank Supervisory Cooperation:
Remarks at the International Conference of Banking Supervisors 3 (Sept 24, 1981) (availa-
ble at Federal Reserve Bank of New York), quoted in Reisner, Default by Foreign Sover-
eign Debtors: An Introductory Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 5. Dr. Wallich views this
reliance as "too complacent an attitude." Id. at 3, quoted in Reisner, supra, at 5.
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default, a moratorium, or the classification of a loan as a non-per-
forming asset is reasonably certain to lead to future negotiations
once normalization is under way. The cost to the borrower of a
failure or violation of covenant under the loan agreements will be
exacted in higher interest payments, lower credit ratings, or the
provision of collateral to secure loans. In the meantime the threat
of the collapse of the international financial system, triggered by
the default of a major borrower, might require action by the Fed-
eral Reserve and other central banks. Action by these lenders of
last resort will have serious consequences for the monetary base,
the money supply, inflationary expectations, interest rates, and the
economy.
Although a big lender cannot effectively enforce a loan agree-
ment against a defaulting big borrower, there are other advantages
in concluding a legal agreement with the borrower. In a hypotheti-
cal Mexican default, Mexico might not be able to argue success-
fully in a non-Mexican forum that changed circumstances (falling
oil prices) or Mexican law give it the right unilaterally to end or
modify the loan agreement in a manner contrary to the terms of
the agreement itself." The intervention of the Federal Reserve may
not be possible unless a formal default or other failure under the
loan agreements is declared. Cross-default provisions will not take
effect in the absence of formal default. The seizure of Mexican as-
sets deposited with the lender may also require a formal prior dec-
laration of default. Most significantly for future negotiations, the
lender will be entitled to some form of compensation for its rights
under the violated loan agreement. Besides, the lender's desire not
to be shut off from a major economy that may prosper in the fu-
ture is likely to induce avoidance of any formal breach.' Future
business prospects weigh heavily in decisions regarding responses
to breaches of individual transactions.
Bank loans to foreign sovereign borrowers have self-enforcing
features. A self-enforcing agreement in economic theory has "an
object that is the equivalent to [sic] a deferred payment or bond.
This is the expected value of the future gains that can be lost by
the party who violates the implicit terms of the self-enforcing
I See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 Nr'L LEGAL MATERI-
ALs 1 (1978) (Dupuy, Arb.).
I Professor Reisner has commented that, with the exception of the Iranian default,
"there is an astonishing paucity of litigation involving claims by U.S. banks on foreign sov-
ereign debtors." Reisner, supra note 7, at 6.
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agreement." 10 The lender is primarily concerned with the help it
can obtain from the Federal Reserve in the event of a major de-
fault. Milton Friedman explained that the panic about the default
on foreign government debt was based on a misunderstanding; gov-
ernments never pay their debts, they only refinance them."
In practice, a rescheduling of debts means that short-term
loans to foreign governments are not liquid assets and that inter-
est payments will not necessarily all be received in cash-even if
the loan agreement provides to the contrary. Thus, the November
1982 agreement between Poland and its Western creditor banks to
reschedule $2.3 billion of commercial debt provides for the pay-
ment of $1.2 billion of interest due in 1982 on the understanding
that the banks will recycle $550,000,000 as short-term trade credits
back to the Government of Poland. The rescheduled principal was
to carry an interest rate of 1.75% above the cost of obtaining funds
in the London money market. 2 The loan agreements between the
Western commercial banks and Poland, and the agreements to
reschedule, confirm the mutual dependence and long-term rela-
tionship between the two sides. Even the repayment of interest
due is tendered on the understanding that the relationship will be
deepened and compounded by the new commercial credits. In a
long-term inextricable relationship the concept of short-term
credit may thus be illusory. The loan agreements to reschedule
have given the banks Poland's commitment to pay more on the
rescheduled funds than it would have to pay were it not in arrears.
The existence of a lender of last resort, either a central bank or an
international institution such as the International Monetary Fund,
eases the strains of mutual dependence, reduces lenders' risks, and
creates even more complex patterns of sustained and inextricable
relations.
Juridically binding loan agreements can accomplish much
more than is apparent from reading their texts. These potential
objectives are also far removed from what Macaulay, in his pio-
neering study on commercial contracts, described as the main di-
mension of conventional contractual planning: the definition of
performance, the effect of contingencies, the effect of defective per-
formance, and the availability of legal sanctions."' In sustained
10 Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27, 43 (1980).
: Financial Times, Sept. 23, 1982, at 21.
2 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, § 4, at 15, col. 3; id., Nov. 3, 1982, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
iS Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. RE V. 55, 60 (1963).
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and inextricable relations a principal use of contracts is to pro-
vide a basis for renegotiations once a defective performance
occurs.
The objective in specifying events of default in a loan agree-
ment is to describe those circumstances in which the lender
...should have the right to terminate the lending commit-
ment .... The exercise of such a right is drastic and banks
rarely exercise it except as a last resort when other measures
are not, or cannot be, effective. This right is primarily impor-
tant to bank lenders for getting the attention of and negotiat-
ing with a financially or otherwise troubled borrower . . . in
order to effect other measures, like restructuring the credit, or
obtaining guarantees or collateral or other credit support, or
selling assets. 14
B. The "External," "Internal," and "Relational" Aspects of Rules
A complete account of what makes agreements effective in
sustained relationships cannot be limited to the two aspects of
rules that are dear to modern legal theory-their "internal" and
"external" dimensions. Thus, for example, Hart's discussion of the
concept of rule, for all its indebtedness to Wittgenstein and Winch,
fails to account for the effectiveness of legal instruments in ongo-
ing relationships. "The fact that rules of obligation are generally
supported by serious social pressure," he writes, "does not entail
that to have an obligation under the rules is to experience feelings
of compulsion or pressure.' 15
The internal aspect of rules is often misrepresented as a mere
matter of 'feelings' in contrast to externally observable physi-
cal behaviour . . . .But such feelings are neither necessary
nor sufficient for the existence of 'binding' rules. . . . What is
necessary is that there should be a critical reflective attitude
to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard
16
The notion of serious social pressure clearly refers to pressure for
compliance with an obligation coming from outside the relation-
ship, from third parties and the relevant community that has a
14 Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under International Bank Loan Agreements with
Foreign Service Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L.F. 89, 90.
15 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-86 (1961).
16 Id. at 56.
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stake in the effectiveness of the rules. This point of view is incom-
plete and fails to explain how the rules function as rules for the
entities that are engaged in sustained and durable relationships.
In a relational order there is also an awareness that a breach
of certain patterns of behavior may be interpreted by another
party as indicating a change in the relationship. This is not solely a
matter of how members of a group who accept rules view their own
regular behavior.17 For example, a presidential candidate who was
committed to repudiate an international agreement before taking
office may find himself in the position of "having to" confirm it
after his election. This phenomenon cannot be fully explained in
terms of the internal/external dichotomy. Fidelity to established
patterns of behavior is dictated by concern for the perception of
other parties and the complexity of interactions with those who are
more than interested bystanders. This phenomenon can be dubbed
"the relational aspect of rules." It is by no means incompatible
with the internal/external dichotomy that Winch derived from
Wittgenstein and that Hart popularized for legal theory. Explana-
tions of durable and inextricable relations require broadening of
Wittgenstein's insights. Actors may be seen as concerned less with
their own attitude to the rules and practices or with pressure from
strangers to the relationship than with the maintenance of a par-
ticular mode of relations among themselves.
C. Sanctions
Durable relations are often damaged by attempts to enforce
agreements by sanctions. The breach of an agreement casts a
shadow over a relationship that is deepened further by efforts to
involve the State in the dispute. In the industrial relations of free
societies the problem has arisen everywhere even as the legal issues
often vary. In Britain, sanctions against collective groups such as
unions raise questions about the legal standing of the union with
respect to its members.18 Collective agreements are concluded with
unions, but in Britain unions are not regarded as the agents of
their members." In any event, "unconstitutional" action by trade
unions is not the real issue. The problem is strikes that are both
unofficial and unconstitutional. 20 From a purely legal point of view
sanctions are not the answer: "[T]hose who would be bound by the
17 Id. at 87.
18 DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 1, § 470, at 125-26.
29 Id. § 477, at 128-29.
20 Id. § 479, at 129.
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agreements do not break them in any event, and those who are in
the habit of breaking them would not be bound."2' But the legal
objections to sanctions are the least significant ones. The Donovan
Commission noted that employers were reluctant to enforce legal
sanctions against their own employees.22
Quite apart from the question of the legal status of collective
agreements, employers in England can sue the large majority of
strikers to obtain damages for breaches of contract. The law can
intervene at the option of the employers, but hardly any employer
ever resorts to this right. The employers' association, the CBI, told
the Commission that the failure to sue for breaches of contract is
"not so much because the measure of damages against one
man might be very small compared with the cost and incon-
venience of litigation and because the chance of recovering the
damages was doubtful, but because the main interest of the
employer is in a resumption of work and preservation of good
will."2
3
It is not in the interest of employers to heighten resentment among
workers by summoning them before a court, especially at a time
when in most cases the strike will have ended.
Whatever deterrent effect such court proceedings may have
will be outweighed by the harm they are liable to do future
relations on the shop floor, on the building site, in the office.
The same would in our opinion also apply if an employer de-
ducted from wages any amount awarded to him by way of
damages .... .
No proposal for sanctions that involved any measure of em-
ployer participation, even under "automatic sanctions" schemes,
was endorsed by the Commission."5 "Automatic sanctions" cannot
function without the involvement of employers, at least with re-
gard to notification that the strike action had taken place and of
the names of those who had taken part. In the United States, how-
ever, legal sanctions do exist for breach of collective agreements.
21 Id.
2 Id. § 463, at 123.
1S Id. (quoting paragraph 170 of the CBI's "evidence" to the Commission).
24 Id.
25 The thrust of an "automatic sanction" scheme was that "the strikers should suffer a
detriment irrespective of the wish of some person to bring legal proceedings." Id. § 489, at
132-33. The Commission concluded that, in reality, "[t]here is no such thing as an automatic
sanction" and regarded any form of sanctions as unworkable until such time as "employers
may be able and willing to use such rights as the law gives them." Id. § 502, at 136.
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Most collective agreements are drawn so as to make the full range
of legal sanctions available. The cost of poor industrial relations in
terms of industrial performance and productivity is notorious.
Nevertheless, in the United States "a process of litigation and ad-
judication [has become] the most marked characteristic of the col-
lective bargaining relationship." 6
It comes as no surprise that in his study of manufacturers' ex-
change relations, Macaulay reached, by and large, similar conclu-
sions about the high cost of enforcement.17 Business exchange dif-
ferences are usually adjusted without dispute. When disputes do
arise, they are often resolved without reference to a contract or to
potential or actual legal sanctions. Businessmen are reluctant to
speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue.
Even where the parties have a detailed and carefully planned
agreement, which indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller
fails to deliver on time, often they will never refer to the
agreement but will negotiate a solution when the problem
arises apparently as if there had never been any original
contract.28
In the words of a purchasing agent, "'You don't read legalistic
contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do business
again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business
because one must behave decently.' 2 9 Just as employers in Brit-
ain are loath to sue their employees, so it seems that in the United
States corporations were involved in relatively few civil actions re-
garding private contracts. Contract suits often result in a "divorce"
ending the "marriage" between two corporations. Contract actions,
moreover, often carry overtones of bad faith. Typically, actions in-
volving private contracts tend to involve the termination of
franchises: they are more closely related to ending a relationship
than to settling differences that arise within it. 0
The need to enforce contracts with the remedies of the law of
the State is by no means self-evident. We are told that in Japan
the legal enforcement of the contractual relationship is quite pre-
carious. 1 In California, in the middle of the last century, the gold
26 Summers, supra note 4, at 536.
27 Macaulay, supra note 13, passim.
2Id. at 61.
29 Id.
10 See id. at 65-66.
31 Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAw IN JAPAN 41, 47 (A.
von Mehren ed. 1963).
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rush surged at a time when there was no government or state to
assign exclusive ownership rights to gold-bearing lands.32 All non-
privately-owned land was technically the property of the United
States, but for almost twenty years after Mexico ceded California,
there was no federal or state law governing the acquisition of min-
ing rights in federal lands. Yet, throughout this period, miners who
worked the gold fields concluded land allotment contracts and
designed for themselves legal regimes that did not involve the
State in any fashion.33 Moreover, it is said that there are eight
ways in which damages recovered in contract litigation do not put
an injured party in as good a position as if the contract had been
performed. 4 "As a result, it is nonlegal sanctions, not 'the law,'
that keep contracts from being breached in most standard dealings
between parties."35 Schelling has observed that "tacit negotiation
of unenforceable agreements can sometimes be more efficacious
than explicit verbal negotiation of agreements that purport to
carry some sanction."3
Even in circumstances in which no relational considerations
arise, coercive sanctions are hemmed in by serious limitations such
as the insufficiency of resources, the ambiguous relationship with
deterrence, the importance of socialization, the antecedent charac-
ter of the norms, and the minority character of deviance. Coercive
sanctions, which come into play in a statistically small percentage
of events that make up social life, depend upon the prior existence
of procedural norms that govern their applicability.
Barkun has identified two important consequences that follow
from these relational considerations:
First, coercive sanctions need not be the mainstay of law inas-
much as the vast number of social interactions seems never to
invoke them or to be due to their presence. To limit law solely
to instances in which sanctions are applied (a not uncommon
approach) is to reduce it to social pathology. Second, the pro-
cedural consensus upon which sanctions are based is perceived
to be ideologically and perhaps temporally prior to the use of
force. 7
3 Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 421, 428-30 (1977).
33 Id. at 429-30.
3, Mueller, supra note 6, at 836 (citing 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 276-88
(1937)).
35 Id. at 836.
39 T. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE 140 (1966).
37 M. BARKUN, LAw WITHOUT SANCTIONs 64 (1968).
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D. Forms of Agreement
In a relational order, agreements between the parties need not
take any particular form. Some agreements may be reduced to
writing. Others may be tacit and informal. The parties are always
free to assign special modes of interpretation to particular written
agreements.
On the matter of the form of agreements the relevance of the
findings of the Donovan Commission to other legal contexts is
striking. For example, agreements concluded in the United Nations
in the course of negotiations between groups of states on the text
of resolutions display practically all the features that the Donovan
report ascribes to collective agreements in England. 8 The Com-
mission may without knowing it have expounded legal theory, for
its findings seem to fit collective negotiations generally, whether
they take place in an English factory or in an international arena.
Thus, under the Charter of the United Nations, resolutions of the
General Assembly that are not binding for member States may
nevertheless acquire legal significance inasmubh as they may ex-
press an agreed interpretation of the Charter or express an agreed
practice under the Charter. Resolution 2625 (XXV) on "Friendly
Relations" thus "declared," by the unanimous consent of the Gen-
eral Assembly, an agreed interpretation of provisions of Article 2 of
the Charter that has since become part of the peremptory norms of
the law of nations from which no derogation is permitted under
the Law of Treaties. 9
In another example, the famous Resolution 242 of the Security
Council with regard to the situation in the Middle East, which lays
down principles for an agreed settlement between Israel and her
neighbors, did not fall within the ambit of Article 25 of the Charter
and was therefore not binding.' 0 Nonetheless, it acquired legal
force for the States which in negotiations with the United States
agreed to "accept" that Resolution, which then became incorpo-
rated in an international agreement between them and the United
States. As in the case of collective agreements, differences existed
over what the Resolution required and over the weight of the pre-
paratory work that led to its adoption, for example, as to the ques-
tion whether "withdrawal from territories" means withdrawal from
all territories.4 1 As in the case of the collective agreements sur-
" DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 1, §§ 471-472, at 126.
39 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
40 S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR at 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967).
41 S.C. Res. 242 (1)(i), 22 U.N. SCOR at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev. 2 (1967).
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veyed by the Donovan Commission, 2 Resolution 242 became part
of a continuous process in which differences concerning interpreta-
tion could not be separated from claims to modify its effect. In this
process it would have been difficult indeed to point to "the bar-
gain" that had been struck. For every accord, such as the Camp
David Framework Agreements, has provided another more detailed
framework for yet other negotiations on questions that had not yet
been resolved.
It is not surprising that the formality or legal character of in-
ternational agreements and arrangements can itself become the
subject of negotiations. Thus, the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in Helsinki on August
1, 1975, is neither a "treaty" nor an "executive agreement. '43 A
negotiator for the United States commented that
[firom the very earliest discussions in Geneva it became clear
that virtually all delegations desired documents that were
morally compelling but not legally binding. As the negotia-
tions progressed, however, and as various delegations gained
enthusiasm for texts which were to their liking, certain texts
took on some of the tone of legally binding instruments. This
trend was a cause of concern to the U.S. delegation, which
considered that the intent of the participants should be
clearly reflected in the language of the documents. Given the
predisposition of Congress to question the right of the Presi-
dent to conclude important international agreements without
Congressional consent, any ambiguity as to the legal nature of
the texts could become the source of an unnecessary dispute
with the Congress.44
Even though the Declaration as such was clearly not intended
to be legally binding, it remained possible, on account of the lan-
guage used, for the "Document on Confidence-Building Measures
and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament," which is part
of the Final Act,45 to be regarded as binding. Some doubts were
42 See DONovAN REPORT, supra note 1, § 471, at 126.
43 Final Act of The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [hereinafter
cited as Final Act], reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293 (1975).
4 Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242,
246 (1976). Russell's article is discussed in Gottlieb, Global Bargaining: The Legal and Dip-
lomatic Framework, in LAW-MMANG IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 109, 121 & n.28 (N. Onuf
ed. 1982). This section reworks arguments made in Gottlieb, supra, at 121-26, and is printed
with the permission of the Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina.
'5 See Final Act, supra note 43, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 1298-99.
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dispelled by tabling interpretive statements during the course of
the negotiations. Despite the lack of intent to create legal obliga-
tions, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United
Kingdom faced the problem of how best to protect their existing
special rights in Germany under the German Instrument of Sur-
render at the end of World War II.46 An express disclaimer of mod-
ification of Four-Power rights in Germany was thus included by
the three Western powers in the text of their acceptance of the
invitation to the second stage of the Conference and in a statement
in the opening week in Geneva. The Powers eventually felt, despite
the nonbinding character of the Final Act, that some form of dis-
claimer should be included in the Final Act itself.47
To have regarded the Final Act as legally binding would have
had a number of significant consequences even in the absence of
"sanctions" for violations. The Department of State was concerned
that "euphoria over this event might lead to increased pressure for
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and for other forms of uni-
lateral disarmament. ' 48 It played down the Conference as an exer-
cise that "was primarily of interest to the allies of the United
States and which in any case had not produced documents of a
legally binding character. ' 49 The United States was also reluctant
to concede that the Conference had finalized the status quo in Eu-
rope and recognized the frontiers in Europe, confirming Soviet he-
gemony in Eastern Europe and in the Baltic States. According to
the same participants, it was the view of "all" the Western negotia-
tors that the Declaration does not depart materially from previous
international arrangements on frontiers and "does nothing to rec-
ognize existing frontiers in Europe. ' 50 To this end, Western repre-
sentatives sought to avoid legal obligations of any kind and treated
the question of frontiers merely as a facet of the principle of the
nonuse of force that had been developed in the United Nations
Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States. Recognition of the existing frontiers was also re-
sisted because of the interest of the Federal Republic of Germany
in an eventual reunification with the German Democratic Republic
and because of insistence by States in the European Economic
Community that no statement be made in the Final Act that might
4' See Russell, supra note 44, at 257.
47 Id. at 257-59.
49 Id. at 242.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 249.
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frustrate an eventual political union of the Community. 1
Particularly useful materials on the formality and legal effect
of international engagements can be found in the Senate Hearings
on an Early Warning System in Sinai. In seeking the Senate's ap-
proval for the American proposal to send technicians to Sinai, the
Secretary of State distinguished among several types of documents
submitted to Congress.52 He referred to documents that include as-
surances, undertakings, and commitments that are considered to
be legally binding upon the United States and that were initialed
or signed by the United States and one of the parties. He warned
that not all the provisions of documents that also contain legally
binding5" commitments are considered to be legally binding. Some
are and some are not so binding; some provisions reflect assurances
by the United States of political intentions: "These are often state-
ments typical of diplomatic exchange; in some instances they are
merely formal reaffirmations of existing American policy. Other
provisions refer to contingencies which may never arise and are re-
lated-sometimes explicitly-to present circumstances subject to
rapid change."" Dr. Kissinger stated that the documents submit-
ted to Congress contain all assurances and undertakings that are
binding on the United States and assured the Committee that the
Administration will make no contrary claim in the future, nor will
it accept any contrary claim by any other government.5 5 The Sec-
retary of State pointed out that
[t]he fact that many provisions are not by any standard inter-
national commitments does not mean, of course, that the
United States is morally or politically free to act as if they did
not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of
diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United
States so long as the circumstances that give rise to them con-
tinue. But they are not binding commitments of the United
States.56
He submitted to the Committee extracts from documents in
the negotiating record that, "although not regarded by the Admin-
'1 See id. at 250-52.
52 See 73 Dzp'T ST. BuLL. 609 (statement of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) (Oct. 7, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Kissinger
Statement].
"Id. at 611.
Id. at 612.
See id. at 611.
Id. at 613.
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istration as binding, might be so regarded by others. '5 The Com-
mittee was also supplied with documents that are explicitly de-
scribed as a part of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel,
without the United States being a party to the instrument. Other
kinds of documents might also be in existence: minutes, notes, and
other documents in the negotiating record containing assurances,
undertakings, and commitments of a nonbinding character only.
The statement of the Secretary of State highlights the delicate
distinctions between types of assurances, undertakings, commit-
ments, and political intentions of the United States. These distinc-
tions suggest several categories of material and give meaning to the
concept of binding obligations:
-Legally binding provisions in an agreement that are recog-
nized to be binding in the sense that the United States recognizes
it is not free to disregard them and that are governed by the rules
of international law regarding legal agreements.
-Provisions that one party to an agreement but not another
party may regard to be legally binding.
-Assurances, undertakings, commitments, and statements of
political intentions that declare or reaffirm existing American pol-
icy and that are not intended to be legally binding.
-Assurances, undertakings, commitments, and statements of
political intentions that refer to contingencies that may never arise
or that relate to present circumstances subject to rapid change.
-Undertakings or assurances that are conditioned on existing
or prior legislative authority and approval.
Statements and provisions of documents that are not legally
binding engage States politically and morally, in the sense that
they are not free to act as if they did not exist. The undertakings
engage the nations' good faith so long as the circumstances that
gave rise to them continue. Provisions and instruments are not
binding without the intent to give them a legal character. Treaties
and executive agreements are legally binding instruments by virtue
of their formal character. Other nonbinding memoranda of agree-
ment, however, can contain legally binding provisions. The public-
ity inherent in the Senate's consent power involves the Congress in
the process of agreement, reducing the possibility that it may not
wish to honor the commitments of the Administration. In the case
of the Sinai Agreements, the Administration made it clear that the
Congress was only invited to approve the American proposal re-
57 Id. at 611.
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garding the limited role of the United States in the Early Warning
System in Sinai. Dr. Kissinger emphasized that a vote in favor of
that proposal would not commit the Congress to a position on any
one of the elaborate United States commitments to Israel made as
part of the package deal.58 Congress was not asked to approve the
undertakings and assurances to the parties. In the complex rela-
tionships between the United States, Egypt, and Israel that were
compounded by domestic constitutional constraints, the parties
distinguished among many types of commitments without refer-
ence to their enforceability. These distinctions were important to
them and constituted part and parcel of the diplomatic and juridi-
cal regime that was to govern their relationship.
E. Relational Norms and Legal Norms
In sustained relationships, particularly those of an inextricable
nature, agreement is thus not necessarily given a "legal" character.
Whether parties to such a relationship are States, corporations tied
by a longstanding supply agreement, or labor and management,
the advantages attached to the legal character of bargains are
neither trivial nor evident. The decisions to make an agreement for
sale legally binding rather than regard it as a simple business "or-
der," or to characterize an international declaration as a "political"
text rather than as an executive agreement, have major implica-
tions. The reasons for giving an agreement juridical status are by
no means confined to the desire for an enforceable instrument:
-A legally binding agreement will prevent a party to the
agreement from asserting in good faith that it is at liberty to ter-
minate it or to modify it unilaterally.
-A legally binding agreement will have the effect of modify-
ing conflicting preexisting rights and obligations in that
relationship.
-In negotiations and renegotiations, it makes a difference
that one is demanding what is conceded to be a legal right already
established by agreement rather than a new claim. Implementation
of prior legal obligations does not call for a quid pro quo in ordi-
nary circumstances.
-In the event of a breach of a legal agreement the aggrieved
party may be entitled to proceed against the interests and the as-
sets of the other in arenas where it is able to do so, either directly
or pursuant to judicial and administrative proceedings.
" See id. at 611-12.
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-The intervention of third parties (allies as well as adversa-
ries) may depend on there being a violation of a legal obligation or
another contingency characterized in legal terms.
-A legal agreement may require the approval or ratification
of persons and organs that may not be involved in other forms of
agreement. There may also be special registration and reporting
requirements.
-A legal agreement will bind the parties (not only the persons
who concluded them) and will remain in effect in the face of objec-
tions and opposition within the internal organs and constitutional
structures of the parties (provided that the conclusion of the agree-
ment was not ultra vires).
-Legal agreements can recognize or transfer title, recognize
legal status, authorize, license, appoint, exclude, preclude, grant
powers, and contain other provisions about which the parties can
make no contrary claim.
Parties to a relationship thus wish to distinguish between
agreements they regard as legally binding and other agreements,
though in neither case do they expect the terms of the agreements
to be enforceable.
In complex relationships no one should be astonished to find
complex types of agreement that elude analysis in the simple terms
of classical international law or the law of contract. The distinc-
tions between ordinary agreements and those regarded as legally
binding reflect the practice of States and are not the fruits of doc-
trinal writings. They lead and point us to the nature of legal rela-
tions in complex interaction. Those distinctions also account for
the determination by those who take part in deeply entangling re-
lationships to regard some transactions as endowed with a legal
character.
This feature of social relations has also been investigated with
care in Britain in the Report of the Royal Commission on Trade
Unions and Employer's Associations.5 9 It is a peculiar feature of
British law that collective bargaining agreements have not been
subjected to the operation of the legal order. They were not in-
tended to create legal relations of any kind.60 Britain stood almost
alone in the presumption that collective agreements are not con-
tracts. The reasons for the abstention of the legal order were in
part historical and went back to a time when the judiciary shared
in the general hostility to the emergence of labor unions. But there
" See DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 1.
" See id. §§ 470-471, at 125-26.
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were other reasons for the policy that collective bargaining and col-
lective agreements remain outside the law.
[C]ollective bargaining is not [in England] a series of easily
distinguishable transactions comparable to the making of a
number of contracts by two commercial firms. It is in fact a
continuous process in which differences concerning the inter-
pretation of an agreement merge imperceptibly into differ-
ences concerning claims to change its effect."1
Moreover, bargaining takes place at *several levels and in more
than one place at a time. On occasion, an agreement is given the
form of a "resolution" or a "decision" of the particular council or
negotiating board.62 The agreement will also be variable at the will
of such a body and in light of difficulties of interpretation that may
arise. Much of the bargaining that takes place simultaneously at a
number of levels is fragmented and informal. From a legal point of
view it may not be possible to identify the "party" who made the
agreement. There would also be doubts as to contents and evi-
dence about the agreement's meaning. In addition, such agree-
ments may sometimes be found void for uncertainty if they were
ever submitted to a court of law. Other difficulties arise under the
law of agency. The system is "a patchwork of formal agreements,
informal agreements and 'custom and practice'."6 Such bargains
and agreements do not fit easily into the categories of the law of
contracts.
F. Contract
The impact of sustained relationships on the law of contract
has been studied in Europe for more than half a century. In this
country, research in this subject, though comparatively recent, is
well known." I wish to refer to a less familiar body of foreign
scholarship of a highly doctrinal character. In the 1920's, Hauriou
and Renard developed in France the "Theory of the Institution,"
which focused on societal and economic arrangements stretched
out over time and involving complex relations. These were the spe-
cial phenomena of juridical life linked to groups and foundations.
In contrasting "contract" with the "institution," Renard asserted
that "contract is only the t~te-A-t~te of creditor and debtor, of
41 Id. § 471, at 126.
"2 Id. § 472, at 126.
" Id.
" See, e.g., L MAcNaa,, supra note 5; Macaulay, supra note 13; Mueller, supra note 6.
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seller and buyer."6 5 The Institution on the contrary is the organi-
zation of an idea: it is an idea detached and emancipated from the
person or persons who have conceived it and integrated it into an
arrangement of ways and means capable of continuing its realiza-
tions and eventually perpetuating its development.6" In this the-
ory, the contractual and the institutional are sharply distinguished.
Indeed, in his view there are three fundamental juridical acts, of
which all others are merely satellites: legislation, contract, and
foundation (or institution). Unfortunately the heavy use of Bergso-
nian and theological terminology in Renard's major work, La Th-
orie de l'Institution, did not invite a wide audience in the Anglo-
American world.67
In the 1950's, Savatier traced the strains generated by the so-
cial and economic changes of modernity on classical Civil Code
contract doctrines.68 These are the changes that came with the
needs of modern corporations for heavy capital investment, large
labor forces, and long-term planning. In the vein of Hauriou, he
asserted that the traditional formal system of contract was shat-
tered and replaced by a new law of "Institution." He developed the
contrast between contract and institution in terms of four main
features.
First, whereas classical contracts are instantaneous, the insti-
tution is lasting. "There can no doubt be continuous or successive
contracts, but they then tend toward the institution." ' All institu-
tions are lasting, whether they be families, foundations, or private
firms. An institution, according to Savatier, is settled, so to speak,
in a time continuum. The Civil Code had conceived of the firm as a
contract or a bundle of contracts. Article 1787 of the Code on the
contract for "louage d'ouvrage," ungainly translated as an "en-
gagement to do a work," was the main text for this purpose:
"When a person is engaged to do a work, it may be agreed that he
will furnish only his work or his skill, or that he will also furnish
the materials. ' 70 This provision originated at a time when artisanal
production was the dominant nonagricultural enterprise, but capi-
63 G. RENARD, LA THiORmE DE L'INSTITUTION 107 (1930).
Delos, The Theory of the Institution: The Realist Solution to the Problem of Moral
Personality and Law with an Objective Foundation, in THE THEORY OF THE INSTITUTION
222, 249 (1970) (citing G. RENARD, supra note 65, at 107).
67 See generally THE FRENCH INsTrruTONALISTS (A. Broderick ed. 1970).
R. SAVATIER=, LES M 'TAMORPHOSES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES DU DRorr ciWL
D'AUJOURD'HUI (2d ed. 1952).
69 Id. § 103, at 86.
70 CODE CILE [C. Civ.] art. 1787 (1981). See R. SAVATER, supra note 68, § 97, at 82-83.
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talism brought new equipment and means of production, and firms
were needed in order to plan and accumulate capital. The firm
"ceased being an isolated contract in order to become a whole se-
ries of contracts, increasingly dependent on the equipment and on
the team of the firm. 71 The basis of an article 1787 contract was a
single person. The firm belonged to him. A single owner could raise
the needed funds. The advent of "socifts anonymes" marked the
emergence of a new type of firm able to secure the considerable
capital needed for industrial enterprise.72 The firm became increas-
ingly "depersonalized," and when the firm provided public service
the State intervened and nationalized it. In this schematic account
of the evolution of the firm, Savatier emphasized the continual
shrinkage of the scope of article 1787 contracts. "It is progressively
absorbed by the institution [of the firm] . . . . [T]his contract, and
the contracting parties, become mere cogs. The will of the parties
loses its control over the contract. '73 Their continuing consent is
not required. And contracts of employment (louage de services)
contemplated in article 1779 of the Code were also conceived in an
artisanal context. 4 Industrial needs for teams of wage earners and
the growth of labor unions led to fundamental changes in labor law
far removed from the provisions of article 1779 of the Code Civile.
The transformation of the contract into a durable relationship can
also take place with the intervention of the State, for example, as a
result of the protection of tenants by rent control legislation. Many
leases have acquired an unlimited time frame, and the same holds
true of a variety of other relationships that had a contractual
origin.
Second, it is not the time component alone that contrasts in-
stitutions and contracts. Sustained relations involve third parties,
for "institutions have made the contract burst also in the spatial
dimension. 't m The principle of article 1165 of the Civil Code that
limited the effect of contracts to the parties thereto no longer gov-
erns the working of institutions. 76 The simplistic concept of the
Code that anyone's business is his private affair does not account
for the ties that hold together members of a civilized society and
its growing complexity. The socialization of contracts is widespread
71 R. SAVATIR, supra note 68, § 98, at 83.
72 Id. § 99, at 83-84.
72 Id.
74 See C. Civ. art. 1779 (1981).
76 R. SAVATmR, supra note 68, § 104, at 87.
74 C. Cir. art. 1165 (1981); R. SAVATER, supra note 68, § 104, at 87.
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in France: as the contract is "metamorphosed" into an institution,
socialization is even more pronounced. On account of institutions,
the effects of contracts are rarely limited to the parties, so that
"these effects like echoes, are bounced back again and again inside
a universe in which all institutions are solidary.""
The third characteristic of institutions, and of sustained rela-
tions, is their flexibility. This contrasts with contracts that "had
something rigid" about them.7 8 Change could come only with the
full agreement of all the parties to a contract. Legislation has made
many types of agreement more flexible (for example, employment
contracts) so as to meet ever-changing economic needs and public
purposes.79
According to Savatier, the fourth characteristic of institutions
lies in their internal organization and hierarchical structure.80
Complex enterprises have organs and internal relationships that
import within the institution numerous constitutional problems af-
fecting the individual liberty of its members. This feature of insti-
tutions arises whenever sustained internal relations lead to the
adoption of procedures and structures designed for the manage-
ment of those internal relations. Every institution thus develops an
"internal personality" expressed in organs, rules, and procedures.
The final metamorphosis of institutions takes place when the
State intervenes. Institutions then become subject to the State
through government planning and nationalization.81 Savatier's
Metamorphoses and the Proceedings of the Association Henri
Capitant on the nature of the firm82 anticipate in some respects
the research on contract by Macaulay, Friedman, and Macneil.8 3
Working in a different legal environment and using different meth-
ods of analysis, French scholars reached conclusions similar to
those reached in America with respect to the impact of long-term
relations on the informal practices of corporate enterprises.
7 R. SAVATIER, supra note 68, § 104, at 88.
75 Id. § 105, at 88.
79 Id.$0 Id. § 106, at 88-89.
" Id. § 108, at 90-91.
82 R. SAVATIER, supra note 68; 3 TRAVAUX DE L'AssociATrON HENRY CAPrrANT POUR LA
CULTURE JuRuDiQUE FRANCAISE 39-233 (1948).
3 See L. FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAW IN AmERICA (1965); Macaulay, supra note 13. I.R.
Macneil's contribution to an understanding of relational aspects of the law of contracts in
the United States is capital. Prominent among his many works are L MAcNEML, supra note 5;
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. RWv. 691 (1974).
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G. Relationism and the Constitution
There is a relational dimension to constitutional interpreta-
tion, and this is perhaps nowhere as apparent as in regard to the
separation of powers doctrine. What is at stake in this area, after
all, is not merely a system of checks and balances, but also the
relationships that must develop between the branches for there to
be a workable government. The Supreme Court has affirmed that
"in the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch
of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and
the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect
from the others."8 ' The separation of powers doctrine, joined with
the political questions doctrine, "requires that federal courts on oc-
casion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the
construction given the document by another branch."85 The judici-
ary may have to intervene in determining where authority lies as
between the other two branches of the government. In so doing it
is enjoined by Justice Frankfurter to be "wary and humble."86
But as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has been cautious to give weight to "[d]eeply embed-
ded traditional ways of conducting government," which cannot
supplant the Constitution but "give meaning to the words of a text
or supply them. '87 In the Youngstown case Justice Frankfurter de-
veloped a position that has not met universal approval:
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American Constitu-
tional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In short,
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
"executive Powers" vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.88
The long continued acquiescence of Congress may indeed give de-
cisive weight to the executive construction of its powers. In the
same vein Mr. Justice Jackson said, "[w]hile an interval of de-
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
s' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
s' Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id.
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tached reflection may temper teachings of . . . experience, they
probably are a more realistic influence on my views than the con-
ventional materials of judicial decision which seem unduly to ac-
centuate doctrine and legal fiction."8 He added,
the actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any
of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Arti-
cles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power
the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde-
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress.9"
Indeed, in cases in which the distribution of authority between the
executive and legislative branches is uncertain, such as in the area
of foreign relations, "any actual test of power is likely to depend on
the imperative of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law."9 1
A practice that is deeply embedded and has provoked no pro-
test from other branches of the government cannot replace the text
of the Constitution. But such a practice will not be set aside by
judicial flat as a violation of the Constitution except in very un-
usual cases. There may indeed be something frivolous, a little pre-
sumptuous, and slightly absurd in courts of law or scholars decree-
ing that a time-honored pattern of practices shall overnight be
regarded as unconstitutional. Patterns of government that are
deeply entrenched should not be at the mercy of sudden shifts of
judicial attitudes or of newly held convictions of judicial officehold-
ers that these patterns undermine the Constitution. The same
gradual process that establishes such a practice may be required to
modify it. Any other attitude would merely encourage judicial
"coups" and further judicial involvement in political controversies.
For even though the Constitution is not a contract between the
different branches, agreed practices under the Constitution are evi-
dence of what the Constitution was understood to require and
should not unilaterally be set aside by any of the three branches as
part of a novel reading of the text of the Constitution itself. In this
" Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
0Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
91 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
[50:567
Relationism
respect, constitutional interpretation is analogous to the interpre-
tation of any accord intended by parties to design a framework for
their relationship. But the analogy is limited. The significance of
"past practice" under the Constitution cannot be equated with
that of "practice" under the Uniform Commercial Code.9 It may
be closer to that of "past practice" as a criterion for interpreting
collective labor agreements, owing to their character as a frame-
work for coexistence between groups.
A fundamental distinction between contracts and other instru-
ments that regulate the relations of different groups was originally
suggested by Gierke98 and later developed by Leon Dugit.94 This
distinction, which anticipated the "Theory of the Institution,"
could shed some doctrinal light on the character of the Constitu-
tion as it governs the separation of powers. According to Duguit a
"collective juridical act" is neither a unilateral act nor a contrac-
tual act. It is known in German as a Vereinbarung, a term that has
been translated as "union."95 The interpretation of such collective
juridical acts involves considerations that are primarily relational,
thus permitting the groups regulated by the instrument to develop
their relationship with a view to their shared purposes. A constitu-
tion clearly belongs to the species of juridical acts contemplated by
Duguit. Practice under a constitution acquires a salience that can-
not be compared with that of practice in classical contract law,
hence the importance of the many episodes, pronouncements, and
other texts that express constitutional practice and to which re-
spect and deference are due. The respect and deference that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter insisted upon are due not for reasons of cour-
tesy, but on account of the relational character of the Constitution
itself. A constitution cannot be read like an ordinary statute that
expresses the will of the legislator. It belongs to a different species
of juridical instruments. It is neither legislation nor contract, but a
collective juridical act. In Renard's terminology it is a "founda-
tion" of an "institution."
' One of the underlying purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code is "to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usages and agreement of the
parties." U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1972).
s 0. Gnuxm, DIE GENOSSENSCHAFrSTHEORM UND DI DEuTScHE RECHTSPRECHUNG 133
(1887).
" Duguit, Collective Acts as Distinguished from Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 753 (1918).
" See id. at 761, 763.
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H. Relational Juridical Acts
One need not accept institutional theory as a whole, with its
elaborate doctrinal trappings, in order to recognize the distinction
between classical contracts and other types of juridical acts that do
not have a transactional focus. This distinction, which lies at the
heart of the relational approach, separates juridical instruments
that contemplate an isolated bargain, a transaction, or a short-
lived episode from those that contemplate a framework for an on-
going relationship or venture. This distinction, which the French
institutionalists developed with characteristic conceptual complex-
ity, is echoed in the work of American scholars of the law of con-
tracts and industrial relations, where they lament the heavy trans-
actional bent of classical contract law and its inadequacy in
relational settings. Macneil, for instance, makes a herculean effort
to reveal the common grounds between the classical law of con-
tracts and a more relational viewpoint." The question arises, how-
ever, how far the transactional and relational viewpoints in the law
of contracts are compatible and whether the tension between the
two is not such that a conceptual separation of the transactional
and the relational must be acknowledged. For once the full mea-
sure of the distinction between the two is revealed, relational acts
appear as a distinct category of juridical acts: they are acts in-
tended to have a juridical effect that rest on a continuing express
or tacit understanding between the parties and acts that are in-
tended to govern the relationship in a durable manner. These rela-
tional acts make possible a unified treatment of questions of inter-
pretation in fields as distinct as the law of treaties, relational
contract law, constitutional law, and the law of collective labor
agreements. Indeed, as this article suggests, a whole range of other
issues would appear to unite these fields: in all of them the bases
for the effectiveness of juridical instruments-their form, their
derivation, and the role of the State-are broadly analogous. This
analogy strongly invites a recasting of legal theory so as to make
room between the three traditionally recognized categories of ju-
ridical acts-legislation, contract, and judicial decision-for rela-
tional acts as a fourth and fully separate category.
Relational juridical acts take many forms. Some are required
as a framework for a protracted relationship that is designed to
traverse the unknown regions of time. in the same way that an
army in column advances into an enemy country; the encounters
"See generally I. MAcNrL, supra note 5; Macneil, supra note 83.
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with unexpected events in uncharted future regions preclude either
the precise planning or the deference to textual authority associ-
ated with ordinary discrete contracts. Other relational juridical
acts in the course of a relationship take the form of arrangements,
practices, and the other interactions required by the relentless ad-
vance through time and circumstance. Some of these acts are built
in the stable materials of binding instruments, while others rep-
resent ephemeral arrangements and understandings.
Relational juridical acts as conceived in this article are not to
be confused with institutions or any other concept of legal person-
ality. Relational acts can endow relationships with legal personal-
ity, by incorporation for example, but they need not do so. Thus
joint ventures and long-term supply agreements fall short of the
creation of an "institution" with legal personality. Yet the logic of
all these acts is inscribed in the common interests and purposes
that have to be ferried forward through time.
II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF RELATIONAL ORDERS
The view that law and its social environment stand in a rela-
tion of reciprocal influence is certainly not a novel one.97 But this
view provides singularly little insight for the scholar who wishes to
discern and understand the forces that give law its efficacy in
human affairs. The notion of the "social context" within which law
functions has proven to be of such indeterminacy that a baker's
dozen such notions can be found in the literature of sociology and
of anthropology. The search for "social context" has, for example,
led Lon Fuller to focus on a spectrum of relationships that run
from intimacy to hostility.9" With a similar objective in mind, Ro-
berto Unger has traced the emergence of bureaucratic law and the
disintegration of community and law in postliberal society." Some
fifty years before, Hauriou and Renard in France and Santi Ro-
mano in Italy had investigated the nature of the "Institution" and
its interplay with the creation of law.100 In his massive compen-
dium Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, Julius Stone sur-
veyed the vast panorama of efforts to account for the variety and
depth of interactions between law and society.101 The scale and
97 It is shared by many schools of jurisprudence; a notable exception is Kelsen's doc-
trine of the "Pure Theory of Law." H. KELSEN, PuRE THEORY OF LAW (2d ed. 1967).
" Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JuPis. 1, 27 (1969).
" R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIEry 58-66 (1976).
100 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
101 J. STONE, SociAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JusTicE (1966).
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breadth of existing scholarship should deter any casual intrusion
into the formidable thicket of sociological jurisprudence. It is here
enough to identify the relational social context as one in which the
juridical order derives its efficacy primarily from factors other than
court-centered enforcement.
The predominance of relational orders in modern society is
apparent when the effect of relations between leading actors is
borne in mind and when the State is no longer viewed as a mono-
lith but a conglomerate of many agencies and institutions. Follow-
ing Daniel Bell,102 we can say that the United States is dominated
not by electoral politics alone but by a "Club of X-Hundreds." The
range and diversity of the participants in this "Club of X-Hun-
dreds" is impressive: The Fortune 500, major banks, labor unions,
political action committees and organized lobbies, the news media,
congressional committees, the several executive departments and
agencies, leading universities, professional organizations, organized
religions, political parties, state and local governments, associa-
tions speaking for ethnic and racial groups, and so on. The State is
no longer the "nightwatchman," the arbiter between rival interests,
but an active participant in the struggle for influence.
This by now familiar image of interacting instrumentali-
ties-including agencies of the State that are themselves under the
influence of special interests-is the image of a "new feudalism" in
which neither the general laws nor the general interest are certain
to prevail. The emergence of "feudal" tendencies in advanced soci-
eties is accompanied by relational phenomena. The measures
adopted to bail out the City of New York and to save the Chrysler
Corporation from failure confirm that these institutions serve the
interests of other leading actors. In like manner, Brazil will not be
allowed to default on its loans because big banks and the interna-
tional financial system will not allow it.
Evidently the members of the "Club" and their interactions
must be studied if one is to learn how law functions as law in the
affairs of modern society. These entities have developed in large
measure with the economy, in response to the structure of repre-
sentative government, and as "countervailing forces" to other pow-
erful organizations. These modern instrumentalities are the succes-
sors to the corporations or associations (gemeinde) prominent in
the works of Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, and Gierke-the "inter-
mediate groups" that stood between the State and the individual.
101 D. BEu, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1976); D. BELL, THE COM-
ING OF POST-INDuSTRIL SociETY (1973).
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They were the guilds, foundations, and other associations that had
retained the right to live according to their own laws and privileges
that the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Codes had done so
much to sweep away.
A. Relational Concepts
What then are the features of some of the recurrent concepts
in this analysis? These include the ideas of a relational order, the
formal system, the mediating system, the regime of a relationship,
and a relational society. Let me try a brief sketch, albeit with some
repetition.
1. Relational Order. A relational order is a pattern of steady
relationships between institutions that are tied to one another by a
variety of expectations, interests, activities, enterprises, or vulnera-
bilities in an ongoing and durable way. In a relational order the
parties are unable to end their relationship without serious adverse
consequences or disruption. In a relational order relations are mu-
tual, deeply impacting, and even inextricable. It is an order in
which relations are codified by the development of a special regime
between the participants. Parties may be tempted to terminate a
relationship when collaboration breaks down or when their inter-
ests are no longer served by its continuation. But where the cost of
termination is too high they may prefer to put up with its
persistence.
Five dimensions of relations between major actors in advanced
societies stand out: they are durable, mutual, deeply impacting,
specialized (with their own history and their own regime), and
horizontal. These dimensions mark the contours of the social con-
text in which legal relations display common features. The interac-
tions between law and the social milieu in which the law functions
impose constraints on the nature of legal ordering from which no
departure is possible without a change in the social context itself.
Not all five dimensions require elaboration. Although I believe
that many types of personal relations display features of a rela-
tional order, I shall restrict my discussion of the concept of rela-
tional order to collective or institutional relationships, so as to
avoid the controversies that accompany theories of human behav-
ior and motivation. The relations of institutions, organizations, and
States cannot be understood as a composite of personal relations.
There is no need to overload legal theory with the baggage of dis-
putes from other fields. In a sense the behavior of States and other
institutions activated by the concept of interest is more transpar-
ent than the fathomless range of human actions and emotions.
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An account of relational orders should distinguish between the
following:
(i) Horizontal and vertical relations. In horizontal relations
none of the actors has the power to coerce the others or the power
to coerce is quite balanced, while in vertical relations a hierarchical
structure truly reflects one-sided domination and power. Horizon-
tal relations involve situations in which the law is unenforced and
unenforceable. This familiar situation was well put by Quincy
Wright. "History discloses many instances of the difficulty of law
enforcement in a state, within which are powerful feudal barons,
ecclesiastical organizations, chartered municipalities, cultural mi-
norities, historic estates which were once sovereign, monopolistic
corporations, or wealthy trade unions." 103
(ii) Personal and institutional relations. These are relations
between persons, institutions, and different combinations of both.
(iii) Inextricable and terminable relations. These terms dis-
tinguish those relations that cannot be brought to a conclusion
without eliminating an adversary from relations that can be ended,
even if at some substantial cost.
The durability and the seriousness of the stake in the relation-
ship is a facet of all relational orders, as is the mutuality of the
relation. Mere durability will not prevent the treatment of a weak
party in a vertical relationship as if it were engaged in a set of
discrete transactions or isolated bargains. Mutual dependence
keeps the weaker party from being treated as a disposable
commodity.
Relational orders are characteristic of the relationships be-
tween economic actors, whose failure will not be tolerated in ad-
vanced societies, and of the relationships between other public
bodies and associations. Relational orders are also typical of the
internal relationships of major corporate actors and other
institutions.
A relational order stands at the opposite pole from the order
of episodic bargains characteristic of free market theory in which
buyers and sellers come together casually and for a limited purpose
that can be achieved without entering into any relationship apart
from the exchange transaction itself. In the exchanges of the mar-
ketplace relations are circumscribed, limited to a specific act of ex-
change, and "fungible." The particular act of exchange does not
depend upon the character of the actors or their identity.
103 Wright, Law and Politics in the World Community, in LAw AND POLITICS IN THE
WORLD COMMUNITY 6 & n.10 (G. Lipsky ed. 1953).
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The concepts of a relational order and its opposite, the order
of the marketplace, are useful for an analysis of actual relation-
ships that, needless to say, do not fall neatly into either category.
Thus the internal structure of a firm can be perceived relationally
as a form of economic interaction between capital, workers, and
managers, while the functioning of the price mechanism in the free
market at the other extreme is an instance of the order of episodic
bargains. Intermediate forms of interaction such as the franchise
contract belong somewhere in the middle. A recurring question is
why some economic structures appear in a relational mode while
others are governed by the marketplace. Factors affecting a rela-
tional order are often not monetizable or reducible to a simple
cost/benefit analysis. They include trust, good faith, collaboration,
the quality of life of the parties, and other intangible factors that
largely escape the science of economics.1°4
2. Formal System. The formal system of a relational order
consists of the formal rules, institutions, and instruments that gov-
ern a relationship. The informal system of a relational order con-
sists of the pattern of practices of the parties that may or may not
conform to the formal system. The patterns of interaction between
legislative rules, the formally agreed instruments of the parties,
and their ultimate behavior resist simplistic classification. The line
between compliance and violation, especially in the absence of ad-
judication, remains hazy. For agreed interpretations, custom, prac-
tice, and renegotiated instruments tend to blur the line between
violations and permitted conduct. It is apparent that when the de-
mands of a relationship are paramount neither the law of the State
nor the rules of decision (judicial law) may function as rules of
conduct. The living law, to use the term coined by Eugen Ehrlich,
"[ius not the part of the content of the document that the courts
recognize as binding when they decide a legal controversy, but only
that part which the parties actually observe in life."10 5 It corre-
sponds closely to the action of the informal system. The distinction
between the "living law" and "valid law," the law enforced by the
courts, was also drawn by the Donovan Commission, when it chose
to speak in terms of the "informal" system of industrial rela-
tions.106 Just as Ehrlich pointed out that no use was ever made of
104 This matter was considered in some detail in Macneil, Economic Analysis of Con-
tractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "'Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75
Nw. U.L. REv. 1018 (1981).
E. EHRLICH, FUNDAmENTAL PRINciPLEs OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 497 (1936).
See DONovAN REPORT, supra note 1, §§ 46-52, at 12-13.
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all the contractual penalties in usufructuary leases so long as it was
possible to get on with the lessee at all,1°  so it appears that much
of the legislation on labor relations in England has never been in-
voked and has remained a lettre morte.
The Donovan Commission stressed the contrast between the
formal system of industrial relations in Britain and the informal
one. The formal system is embodied in the official institutions. The
informal system is created by the actual behavior of major indus-
trial actors. 1 8 The informal system is grounded in reality. In Brit-
ain the informal system was found by the Commission to be at
odds with the formal one. The Commission found that "[a]ny sug-
gestion that conflict between the two systems can be resolved by
forcing the informal system to comply with the assumptions of the
formal system should be set aside. Reality cannot be forced to
comply with pretences."' 09
Much about the operation of a legal system cannot be derived
from a study of case law or legislation. The development of com-
mercial relations has seen the rise of new forms of property and
novel credit instruments that do not trace their descent from legis-
lative or judicial sources but from innovations of the financial com-
munity. Some of the developments in this century of new forms of
property and markets, such as certificates of deposit, bankers ac-
ceptances, currency futures, share options, Repo's, NOW accounts,
and the CBOE, are a result of financial practice, not legislation.
Ehrlich's "living law" method for the investigation of emerging in-
stitutions is empirical and direct.
There is no other means but this, to open one's eyes, to in-
form oneself by observing life attentively, to ask people, and
note their replies. To be sure, to ask a jurist to learn from
actual observation and not from sections of a code or from
bundles of legal papers is to make an exacting demand upon
him, but it is unavoidable, and marvelous results can be
achieved in this manner.110
The efforts of the Donovan Commission fit the mode of enquiry
extolled by Ehrlich.
3. Mediating System. A mediating system consists of the tech-
niques used to reconcile the informal system, the actual patterns of
107 E. EHRLICH, supra note 105, at 490.
,08 DONovAN REPORT, supra note 1, § 46, at 12.
i' Id. § 150, at 36.
110 E. EHRLmCH, supra note 105, at 498.
[50:567
Relationism
conduct of the parties, with the requirements of the formal system
of rules and institutions. The mediating system adopted in the law
of industrial relations, in commercial law, and in international law
gives formal legal weight to the practices of parties. It emphasizes
notions like "course of performance," "acquiescence," "waivers,"
"course of dealing," "usage," and "custom." It provides for "agreed
interpretation," "renegotiation," and other modes for changing ob-
ligations acquiesced in by the parties. It lends weight to informal,
tacit agreements that may be expressed in a wide variety of forms
and instruments. A mediating system is concerned with interac-
tions over time. It discourages the assignment of exclusive weight
to the formal legal documents and to the original intention of the
parties.
The role of a mediating system is evident in contracts and in
treaties between parties locked in a complex ongoing relationship.
When contracts or treaties form part of a relational order, resort to
a mediating system for the adjustment of the relationship of the
parties becomes necessary. Emphasis in the law of contracts and in
treaty law to the text of instruments is most appropriate in the
context of episodic bargains or when parties to an ongoing relation-
ship wish to have a particular transaction between them treated as
if it were an isolated transaction. The performance of obligations
under a particular agreement is then not linked with the perform-
ance of obligations under other agreements between the same
parties.
4. Regime. Every relationship in a relational order is charac-
terized by its own rules, procedures, precedents, and practices that
constitute the "regime" of the relationship.
The regime of every relationship tends to be unique. It is a
combination of the formal, informal, and mediating systems-that
is, of the agreements, course of practice, interpretations, course of
performance, usages, and customs. The regime of a relationship in-
cludes the practices of the parties that have been unopposed. The
regime of a relational order tends therefore to have "feudal" fea-
tures: the chief characteristic of the feudal order is that it has few
general laws and consists mostly of agreements. In order to give an
account of the feudal State it is necessary to look at the contents
of the particular grants, charters, agreements, and contracts be-
tween the king, lords, vassals, and villeins. There is no "Feudal
Constitution."
5. Relational Society. A relational society is one in which the
relational orders of the State and the powerful associations, firms,
and institutions of which it is constituted predominate.
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In a relational society the regimes that govern the major social
and economic actors form a substantial part of the "living law" of
the land. A theory of law that considers the municipal ordinances
of a small town as "law" for the purposes of publication and legal
scholarship, but that relegates to the category of private contract
law the formal legal documents and practices that govern the rela-
tionship, let us say, of General Motors and the UAW, conceals
rather than illuminates the way in which law functions as law in
modern society.
The analysis of relational orders is not designed as a blueprint
for how law ought to function, but suggests only how law must nec-
essarily function under the shadow of the informal system. There
are necessary contraints on the operation of relational orders.
There is no way in which key features of such orders can be
modified.
Relationism does not outline an ideal form of legal relations
but rather a necessary one. Thus, for example, when common insti-
tutions are set up in a relational order with the participation of all
the parties to the relationship, formal limitations on the authority
and power of such institutions will remain subject to adjustments
made by the mediating system. Such institutions cannot be de-
prived of their authority to permit, license, legitimize, and con-
demn in a manner that will affect all the members-unless com-
pulsory judicial review is provided for. For example, the General
Assembly of the United Nations, in which all member States are
represented, cannot be prevented by the Charter from adopting
resolutions like the Uniting for Peace resolution,111 which may ju-
ridically license actions by States, even though the Charter of the
United Nations contemplates that binding decisions shall be re-
stricted to those adopted by the Security Council under Article 25
of the Charter.1" The Framers of the Charter neglected to account
for the legitimizing power of the Assembly. The Framers were mis-
taken in attaching too much weight to the distinction between le-
gally binding resolutions and other resolutions adopted by United
Nations organs. Little can prevent States from lending weight to
resolutions that were adopted with their support, even if these are
not binding. The relational order that prevails in the United Na-
tions has transformed the Charter framework through a set of
practices, interpretations, and procedures that often depart from
the intent of the Framers at the San Francisco Conference. The
, GA. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10-12, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950).
U.N. CHsRTER art. 25.
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formal order of the United Nations Charter could not be expected
to control the informal system in effect in its principal organs. On
the contrary, the mediating system of the international order tends
to reflect the informal system in the organization. This much
should have been expected, for the voting majority in control of
the Assembly could not have been prevented from imprinting its
own reading of the Charter in the absence of compulsory judicial
review by the International Court of Justice.
The concepts of a relational order and of formal, informal, and
mediating systems lay the groundwork for a unified theory of law
for all relational orders. Such a theory provides a framework for
investigating how interest groups and other major actors can be
expected to interact and how the public interest can be preserved
in a relational society dominated by "private" agreements between
large institutional actors. Such a theory considers international law
as a paradigm for legal ordering in relational orders. Far from be-
ing a "problem" for legal theory, international law has a profound
explanatory power.
B. Law and State
In a horizontal relational order the law of the State ordinarily
functions as the law of a third party. It governs a relationship to
the extent that the parties are willing to adopt the law of the State
as a rule of conduct or to the extent that the State is able and
willing to enforce its law.
The distinction between the idea of law and the law of the
State has been drawn by historians who investigated the forms of
legal ordering in the era that preceded the emergence of the mod-
ern centralized State. The identification of the idea of law with the
law of the State is the corollary of the idea of law as a coercive
order. Investigation of relational orders, relational societies, and
the legal orders of such societies (in brief, Relationism) points to
the separation between the idea of State and the concept of law.
There was and there remains in effect a plurality of legal or-
ders separate from the State. In a relational order the sources of
law are distinct from those of the law of the State. In a relational
order law is not a coercive system but an interactive one.
The separation of the concept of law from the idea of State is
reflected in the informal system's emphasis on the adjustment of
relationships away from courts. It points to the autonomous law-
creating capability of relational orders. In a relational order the
role, significance, and authority of the judiciary are much reduced.
In a relational society jurisprudence cannot define its task in terms
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of the law of the State or of the decisions of the judges of the
State's courts.
The identification of the idea of law with the State is the re-
flection of a political rather than of a legal ideology that continues
to have a powerful hold on the legal mind. The emphasis on judi-
cial remedies in professional literature has folded within it the
identification of law and State, of law with enforceable decisions.
This emphasis is firmly set in theories that assign to the State po-
litical supremacy in society. Such theories view the State as the
source of all laws. Hence reform, welfare, and justice are all said to
stem from the State. In this identification of the idea of law with
the State, liberal and Marxist doctrines share a common ground.
The separation of the idea of law from the concept of State is
not a novel one. It is a feature of medieval legal theories, legal plu-
ralism, the sociological school of jurisprudence, and institutional-
ism. It can be found in German corporatist doctrines as well as in
theories of international law, canon law, and natural law. It is a
theme that runs through the works of Althusius, Gierke, Ehrlich,
Hauriou, Gurvitch, Renard, Santi Romano, del Vecchio, Harold
Laski, and Lon Fuller.113
The separation of the idea of law from the concept of State
has been used to support a variety of contradictory political causes
such as Social Catholicism, Fabianism, and Fascism. It has suf-
fered a setback on account of the exploitation of corporatist doc-
trines by the Fascist regimes of Petain in France and of Salazar in
Portugal. But none of the propositions advanced in this article owe
the slightest debt to doctrines with which it shares only the rejec-
tion of the thesis that there can be no legal system other than the
legal system of the State.
In a relational order the juridical system does not depend
upon State agencies that make, interpret, or apply the law. In a
horizontal relational order the institutions of a legislature, a judici-
ary, and an executive function only with the continuing consent of
those that are to be governed by them.
In classical adjudication, every case concerns a discrete trans-
action. Common law adjudication typically involves disputes, not
the adjustment of relationships. Adjudication is to an ongoing rela-
tion what surgery is to a patient. It is a traumatic intervention that
attempts to give life to a right but that in the process may some-
times kill the patient, the relationship in which it arises.
I"' The fullest treatment of this subject is found in S. RomANo, L'OsiNAmErro Gz-
unmico passim (2d ed. 1946).
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The modern focus of jurisprudential inquiry on courts is epito-
mized by the famous aphorism of Holmes that "the prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law."11 14 This identification has persisted into
more recent times. In the words of Ronald Dworkin, the question
of jurisprudence is "[w]hat, in general, is a good reason for decision
by a court of law?"'115 This view contrasts with Ehrlich's
perspective:
To a person, however, whose conception of law is that of a
rule of conduct, compulsion by threat of penalty as well as of
compulsory execution becomes a secondary matter. To him
the scene of all human life is not the court room. It is quite
obvious that a man lives in innumerable legal relations, and
that, with few exceptions, he quite voluntarily performs the
duties incumbent on him because of these relations.
16
In ongoing relations, Holmes's "Bad Man" theory of law is quite
removed from the realities of human conduct.1 7
The "thesis of judicial decline" is not new." 8
Of the "team" involved in the making and enforcement of
promises, courts now play an insignificant role. This is evi-
denced by the decreasing opportunity and power of courts to
decide important economic questions, by the tendency to seek
fair results in particular cases, by the inability to obtain ade-
quate data or to influence contract behavior, and by the fact
that the important questions decided by courts are quickly
legislated or drafted out of existence. Since courts have less
and less to do with economically significant contract behavior,
it follows that contract research and teaching must drastically
change its traditional emphasis." 9
C. Sources of Law in Relational Orders
The separation of law and State calls for a theory of sources of
law independent of the State. In a relational order, in which dis-
114 o.W. HOLMES, The Path of Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920).
"' Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the Two-Level Theory of
Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640, 640 (1965).
114 E. EHRLICH, supra note 105, at 21.
11 See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 114, at 174-79.
"I Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context and the Judi-
cial Process, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 822, 823, 825 (discussing L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 83; Ma-
caulay, supra note 13).
" Id. at 825.
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putes are not usually settled by adjudication, there is little need
for rules of recognition to identify the rules that the parties to a
relationship regard as legally binding.
A sharp demarcation between existing rules and new claims is
not a feature of relational orders. Moreover, even when the parties
do not regard rules and commitments as legally binding, it may be
difficult for one of the parties to disregard or modify them unilat-
erally. Fidelity to agreed rules and commitments, whether legally
binding or not, is a requirement of a healthy relationship.
Violations of nonbinding commitments can be as destructive
of trust and good will as violations of juridical obligations. Mutu-
ally agreed forms of interaction in a relationship acquire a stability
and an inertial weight of their own and generate expectations
about the future. A sharp demarcation between the rules of a sys-
tem and those that do not belong to it is a requirement of all bu-
reaucracies and institutions whose task is to apply the rules of
their system only. It is therefore a feature of the legal order of the
State. In a relational order the need for such demarcation arises
only when institutions are set up to apply and administer an iden-
tifiable body of rules, principles, and policies.
A theory of sources in a relational order must identify the for-
mal documents, agreements, and rules which parties intend to
characterize or recognize as legal. It must identify the formal sys-
tem of a relational order. But it should, in addition, identify the
mediating system as a source of legal obligations. Tacit agree-
ments, as well as past practice, course of performance, and other
ingredients of the mediating system, such as acquiescence, function
as sources of law. The formal system, the mediating system, and
the regime of a relational order are all sources of juridical
obligations.
In a relational order the norms that govern the parties are pri-
marily of their own making.120 They are the law of their agree-
ments and contracts. In Roman law the term "lex" originally re-
ferred to a contract. This notion is still found in the French Civil
Code, which is derived from the Roman law: article 1134 provides
that "[t]he agreements legally made take the place of law for those
who made them. ' '121
The sharp distinction between accepted rules and new claims,
between lege lata and lege ferenda, that legal positivism insists
upon, is a facet of State and bureaucratic ordering, not of all jurid-
'12 Fuller, supra note 98, at 14.
121 C. Civ. art. 1134 (1981). See Fuller, supra note 98, at 14.
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ical systems. The line between the interpretation and the modifica-
tion of agreements is a hazy one.
Ill. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE STATE AND THE JURIDICAL SYSTEM
OF RELATIONAL SOCIETIES
The question is frequently posed what purpose can be served
by attempts to characterize as "legal" arrangements in which
neither the courts of law nor the other branches of the government
have a significant role to play. Is the relational approach a mere
definitional exercise? The fact remains that States insist on legal
terminology in relational situations and draw serious inferences
from distinctions between instruments they regard as legally bind-
ing and others they do not. Surely, some new terminology could be
contrived for instruments that are intended to be binding but for
which enforcement in the law courts is not contemplated. By in-
cluding such instruments in the realm of legal discourse deference
is shown to the usage of the very States in whose name we are
invited by positivists not to regard these instruments as juridical.
The difficulty, however, is more fundamental.
In a relational order the emergence of a juridical system does
not depend upon the two minimum conditions that Hart posited as
"necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system." '122
On the one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid ac-
cording to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be
generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recogni-
tion specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of
change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as com-
mon public standards of official behaviour by its officials....
The assertion that a legal system exists is therefore a Janus-
faced statement looking both towards obedience by ordinary
citizens and to the acceptance by officials of secondary rules
as critical common standards of official behaviour. 123
In the complex patterns of interaction between institutional actors
in modern societies, the officials of the State do not play the pre-
eminent role ascribed to them under the Hartian concept of legal
system. Indeed the legal system of the State, which Hart promul-
gates as the only kind of legal system, functions side by side with
the juridical systems of the relational orders that have achieved
122 H.L.A. HART, supra note 15, at 113.
12 Id.
1983]
The University of Chicago Law Review
prominence in modern states. The juridical system of relational so-
cieties must not be confused with the simpler decentralized pre-
legal form of social structure that British administrators encoun-
tered in the Empire and in which there were no officials. The jurid-
ical systems of industrial relations, international relations, and in-
ternational banking cannot be dismissed as primitive or simple on
account of the secondary role played by the officials to which
Hart's analysis attaches such significance.
The legal system of the State may or may not best be de-
scribed in Hart's terms. But the operation of relational juridical
systems side by side with it cannot be understood in terms of a
model explicitly centered on the State's apparatus and officials.
In a relational order a juridical system can be said to arise
when a number of circumstances emerge:
(1) Actors accept or recognize sets of rules, practices, and poli-
cies as binding and legitimate-in the sense that they admit that
they are not at liberty to disregard them-and as proper standards
for assessing the legality of their own actions.
(2) Actors accept that they are not at liberty unilaterally to
modify, terminate, or suspend the operation of such binding rules,
practices, and policies or unilaterally to adopt measures which
have the effect of violating rules, practices, and policies already ac-
cepted as binding.
(3) The rules, practices, and policies that are accepted by ac-
tors as binding can take a variety of forms. They can be negotiated
or adopted unilaterally. They can be found in formal and informal
instruments or tacit agreements. They can be expressed in texts
adopted by institutional or representative bodies and in any other
manner that expresses an intent to create a legal effect.
(4) Binding rules, practices, and policies (except for peremp-
tory norms from which no derogation is allowed) are susceptible to
formal modification, termination, or suspension by agreement only.
In this they differ from moral rules and principles that cannot be
modified, terminated, or suspended even by the agreement of the
parties.
(5) Accepted rules, principles, and policies are interpreted by
reference to the language of juridical instruments as elaborated by
the practices of the actors, their agreed interpretations, their
course of performance to the extent that no objections are raised,
and other usages and customs.
(6) Actors may make demands, claims, and proposals to each
other on the basis of such binding rules, practices, and policies and
may seek to settle their differences by reference to them.
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(7) Actors attempt to secure compliance with such rules, prac-
tices, and policies, and there is a measure of congruence between
their actions and accepted law.
(8) There is a measure of consensus between the actors about
the contents of the rules, practices, and policies accepted as bind-
ing and about the criteria for identifying them as such.
(9) Actors are committed to accept the guidance of these bind-
ing rules, practices, and policies in good faith and to apply them
evenhandedly in all situations, in a neutral, uniform, and consis-
tent manner.
(10) The effectiveness of the rules, practices, and policies ac-
cepted as binding rests primarily on the concern of the actors to
maintain a particular mode of relationship and on other arrange-
ments of their own choosing for escrows, collaterals, guarantees,
and the like.
These ten "circumstances" lack the neatness of the union of
primary and secondary rules upon which Hart built his concept of
a legal system. They are descriptive of juridical relational systems.
(The more obvious practical reasons for endowing a relational or-
der with a juridical dimension have already been mentioned
above.)
IV. PROBLEMS OF RELATIONAL ORDERS
The operation of law in a relational order raises serious
problems that are inherent in all relational orders:
-Emphasis on the informal system and on the practice of the
parties may lead the parties to condone violations of binding
obligations.
-The rights and interests of third parties may be adversely
affected by a course of dealing between parties to an ongoing
relationship.
-The informal system, the actual conduct of the parties, may
be such that it ceases to bear any relevance to the underlying ju-
ridical order.
-There may be considerable uncertainty and ambiguity as to
the extent of the binding obligations of the parties.
-When the relationship between the parties deteriorates and
becomes one of adversity there is little in a horizontal system of
power relations that can be done by any third party. These are
problems of relational orders. The juridical system is powerless to
solve them.
-Conflicts may occur between the juridical systems of differ-
ent relational orders and the State. Resolution of such conflicts
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poses serious problems.
The "living law" and the "informal system" approaches strain
the notions of legality and legitimacy in a manner that can be
deeply offensive to the jurist with a judgmental disposition. This is
compounded by the frequent avoidance of adjudication in the set-
ting of ongoing relations. In international law it is frequently diffi-
cult to distinguish State practice in violation of law from State
practice that sets a precedent. In commercial law, in the absence of
adjudication, the difference between the breach of an agreement
and a course of performance accepted or acquiesced in is also far
from clear,12 4 as is the difference between a violation and a modifi-
cation of an agreement when a waiver of any term inconsistent
with the course of performance'can be shown. 125 Agreements that
modify a'contract need no consideration under the U.C.C. 126
The U.C.C. distinguishes between "contracts" and "agree-
ments.' 1 27 The concept of "agreement" under the Code is close to
the concept of agreement in the Donovan Report. The word
"agreement" in the Code is intended to include full recognition of
a usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance, and the
surrounding circumstances as effective parts of the agreement. It
also bears strong affinities with the concept of "treaty" under Arti-
cle 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2 8 The con-
trast in the U.C.C. between "contracts"-the total legal obligations
that result from the parties' agreement as affected by the U.C.C.
and other applicable rules of law-and between "agreements,"
which make reference to the surrounding circumstances, expresses
the tension between the stability of expectations reduced to writ-
ing and flexibility derived from practice. Flexibility can shade im-
perceptibly into modification or even breach. Where auto-interpre-
tation is the rule, the line between the two cannot be established.
In sustained relations the dominant policy of legal ordering is to
permit the continued maintenance of agreed relations and their ex-
pansion through "custom, usage and the agreement of the parties,"
M" See U.C.C. § 2-208 (1972).
125 See id. § 2-208(3).
120 Id. § 2-209(1).
'27 Compare id. § 1-201(3) (" 'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as
found in their language or implication from other circumstances including course of dealing
or usage of trade or course of performance. . . .") with id. § 1-201(11) (" 'Contract' means
the total legal obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act
and any other applicable rules of law.").
12 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (May
23, 1969).
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to use the formulation of the U.C.C.129 It is unproductive for any-
one to focus on violations, breaches, and other phenomena destruc-
tive of the friendly relations that the legal order is designed to pro-
mote unless the norms violated are fundamental to the legal order.
The practices of parties in a relationship can be injurious to
the interests of bystanders. Especially in a decentralized system
with limited coercive powers, problems arise about the defense of
the public interest. Thus Mr. Andrew Shonfield, in a note of reser-
vation to the Report of the Donovan Commission, felt that the Re-
port placed the welfare of the ordinary citizen at risk and tended
to diminish his liberty by endorsing the deliberate abstention of
the law from the activities of labor and management, the mighty
protagonists in industrial relations.130 His call for criminal law pen-
alties for actions known to be likely to endanger life, limb, or valu-
able property reflects a traditional response to the problem of the
public interest. 31 In international law, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provided in article 53 that there are rules of
international law out of which states cannot of their own free will
contract.1 3 2 The International Law Commission pointed out that
the law of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the prohi-
bition of the use of force constitutes a conspicuous example of a
rule of international law having the charact6r of a jus cogens.133 In
all forms of legal ordering by agreement the problem of the protec-
tion of the public interest or of the interests of third parties arises.
Solutions predicated upon doctrines of public policy, jus cogens, or
upon the intervention of the State are all designed to set limits to
what can be done by agreement. The problem of containing the
hegemonial influence of superpowers has been solved neither in the
law of industrial relations nor in international relations.
Third-party intervention can destabilize agreements that
states have concluded in arduous negotiations. For example,
groups of states hostile to a peace treaty, such as the one con-
cluded between Israel and Egypt, can weaken its legitimacy by de-
claring it contrary to international law.
The question remains what is to be made of rules that are en-
tirely disregarded in practice so that, in Lon Fuller's words, there
1' U.C.C. § 1-102(b) (1972).
130 DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 1, at 288, 291 (Note of Reservation by Mr. Andrew
Shonfield).
131 Id. at 291-92.
,32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (May
23, 1969).
133 Id.
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is no "congruence between official action and declared rule."3 4 He
argues that a total failure of congruence involves a failure to make
law. The official norms cease to have relevance to actual conduct.
His point is well taken, for a total failure of congruence may result
in something that is not legal ordering at all, if by legal ordering
we mean the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the gov-
ernance of rules." 5 The problem of congruence arises whenever the
formal system and the informal one are fully divorced from one
another. Practice that entirely disregards legal instruments and
governing rules hardly qualifies as living law in Ehrlich's sense.
Some connection must remain between the practice and the nor-
mative framework; some interaction must take place between
agreed rules and actual conduct.
The relational approach is not without normative implications.
But it is here presented on its merits rather than as a rationale for
normative inferences. Michel Foucault's eloquent comments about
the nature of "discourse" have their application to legal theoty.3 6
They tell us much about the tie between discourse in any field and
the total context in which it is held. The character of professional
legal discourse at any point in time is deeply fashioned by the "his-
torical circumstances" then prevailing. These include the institu-
tions, modes of behavior, accepted moral norms, the reigning epis-
temology, and the state of other disciplines. These constitute an
often unnoticed element in the context of discourse. Contemporary
legal discourse has been powerfully inflected by the formal institu-
tions of the State and the concomitant concern for decisions and
measures designed to regulate, compel, or induce obedience. Pre-
vailing legal discourse fashions the legal culture which defines what
it is to say something meaningful. The invitation of Relationism is
to attempt a break from the prevailing mind-set of legal discourse.
" L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (1964).
13 Id. at 39.
136 M. FOUCAULT, L'ARcHAOLOGIE DU SAVOIR 55 (1969).
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POSITIVISM AND RELATIONISM:
SOME CONTRASTING FEATURES OF Two TYPES OF LEGAL SYSTEM*
Postivist Legal System**
1. The identification of law with
the law of the State.
2. Law as norms emanating
from State organs for the
State's subjects.
3. Court-centered enforcement
and sanctions are the basis
for the effectiveness of
norms.
4. There are two aspects of
rules, "external" and "inter-
nal," that account for their
binding force.
5. Disputes are settled on a
case-by-case basis by refer-
ences to governing law. There
is no linkage to unrelated is-
sues.
6. A sharp division is asserted
between existing law and de-
sired law, between lege leta
and lege ferenda.
Relational Juridical
System**
Every relational order and in-
stitution is a source of norms.
Law as norms that are ac-
cepted as binding in a rela-
tionship in the sense that
they may not legitimately be
disregarded.
The maintenance of a partic-
ular mode of relations is the
primary basis for the effec-
tiveness of the norms and ob-
ligations of the relationship.
Other relational arrange-
ments, such as the provision
of collaterals, escrows, and
guarantees, are common.
The "relational" aspect of
rules must be added to their
"external" and "internal" as-
pects to account for their
binding force.
Disputes are settled by the
adjustment of relations be-
tween parties unless the par-
ties themselves prefer a case-
by-case disposition. The
linkage of unrelated issues is
a feature of the adjustment of
relations.
The distinction between
claims of right and new
claims is not a sharp one.
The line of demarcation be-
tween lege leta and lege fer-
enda is fuzzy.
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7. Courts of law are the pre-
ferred forum for the settle-
ment of disputes.
8. A sharp distinction is as-
serted between the lawful
and the illegal.
9. Emphasis on prohibited and
obligatory behavior.
10. Emphasis on the adversary
advocacy of rights.
11. Law making by the legislative
and the judicial processes.
12. The legal system of a hierar-
chical, vertical social order.
Negotiation, bargaining, arbi-
tration, and other techniques
for the settlement of disputes
over which the parties retain
control are preferred.
The concern is with legiti-
macy. The line of demarca-
tion between the informal
practices of parties and the
violation of norms is not a
sharp one.
Emphasis on authorized or
condemned behavior.
Emphasis on the manage-
ment of agreed relationships.
Agreement making by negoti-
ated procedures, concurrence,
and acquiescence.
The juridical system of a hor-
izontal, consensual social or-
der.
*These abbreviated formulations are less accurate than those in text.
**The term "legal system" is reserved here for the legal system of the State. The term
"juridical system" is reserved for the legal system of relational orders.
